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Replication Editor: Joel C. HuberIs customer equity a good proxy for a ﬁrm's market value? Using data from Netﬂix over
10 years, I provide evidence that a CLV-based customer equity model tracks market capitaliza-
tion remarkably well under versatile conditions of stable growth, proﬁt volatility, and even a
broad market crash. However, if a ﬁrm shifts business model through radical innovation, the
customer equity model requires recalibration to continue tracking market capitalization.
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.Keywords:
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Innovation1. Introduction
Customer lifetime value (CLV) – the present value of a customer's future beneﬁts to a ﬁrm – has been extensively publicized as
a crucial marketing metric to create ﬁrm value (Fader, 2012; Gupta & Lehmann, 2005). A major empirical foundation for its valid-
ity rests on Gupta, Lehmann, and Stuart (2004), which showed the feasibility of using a ﬁrm's customer equity – the sum of CLVs
over all customers – to derive a ﬁrm's stock market capitalization.
A key proposed feature of customer equity as a proxy for market capitalization is its suitability over all phases of a ﬁrm's
lifecycle, notably in periods of high growth or negative earnings, when traditional ﬁnancial valuation models of the ﬁrm are harder
to apply (Gupta et al., 2004).
However, companies rarely report customer metrics over long enough time for a within-ﬁrm study across phases of its
lifecycle. Thus, the applicability of CLV and customer equity models as tools to drive ﬁrm value across all ﬁrm lifecycle phases
has yet been validated.
Using the customer equity model in Gupta et al. (2004), I conduct a within-ﬁrm case study of Netﬂix – a company that did
report sufﬁcient customer metrics between 2001 and 2011 to consistently estimate CLV – to see how Netﬂix's customer equity
tracked its market capitalization under different lifecycle conditions.
Any evidence based on one ﬁrm can only be suggestive, but this case study offers the ﬁrst reference point on when customer
equity may link closely to a ﬁrm's market capitalization, and when it may not.aluation from customer equity:When does it work andwhen does it fail? International
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capitalization over the following three phases:
1) Initial growth. Netﬂix is a DVD rental business that started trading publicly in 2002 Q2. It did not realize a proﬁt until 2003 Q2
and then slipped back and forth between proﬁt and loss. How well did customer equity track market capitalization in this
phase? Also, did customer equity track market capitalization better during periods of loss versus proﬁt?
2) Expansion and maturity. From 2005 to 2008, Netﬂix steadily grew in customers. It also survived the Global Financial Crisis,
which involved broad stock market declines from 2008 Q3 to 2008 Q4. How well did customer equity perform during this
phase? When markets were crashing during the Global Financial Crisis, did investors rely on customer equity to value the
ﬁrm?
3) Radical innovation. Netﬂix started online video streaming in 2007, offering a service that would replace and outgrow its orig-
inal DVD rental business. How well did customer equity capture market capitalization in this period of radical innovation,
when existing businesses are threatened to deliver renewed growth1?
2. Model
Following the literature,2 Netﬂix's customer equity is the sum of the CLVs of cohorts of customers. Consider at period 0, if n0
customers are acquired at a cost of c0 each, then the CLV of this cohort 0 of customers can be expressed as:1 Rad
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using disclosed customer data.4 The technological substitution model describes cumulative customers' Nt at time t as:Nt ¼
α
1þ exp −β−γtð Þical innovations are products that both integrate a new technology and better satisfy customer needs. Such products yield renewed growth but can make
products obsolete and often require a “willingness to cannabalize” (Chandy & Tellis, 1998).
e the discrete model in Gupta and Lehmann (2005) and Gupta et al. (2004).
is the expression for the customer equity at time 0. The customer equity at a future time j will consist of two parts. The ﬁrst part is the value of the cohorts
after time j and the second part is the future value of retained customers from cohorts acquired from time 0 to time j:
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meters in the technological substitution model are estimated from the full set of actualized customer data over the entire time period. In reality, an investor
the ﬁrm at any time t would not know the actualized customer data after time t. This is not problematic with the assumption that investors can form noisy
iased expectations of the future. This estimation approach and assumption follow the existing literature.
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Table 1
Source data summary
Time Period Periods Average over period Minimum Maximum
Number of customers (‘000s) 2001 Q1 to 2011 Q4 44 7449 303 (2001 Q1) 25,269 (2011 Q3)
Quarterly margin 2001 Q2 to 2011 Q4 43 $20.35 $12.95 (2010 Q4) $31.08 (2004 Q3)
Acquisition cost (per customer) 2001 Q2 to 2011 Q4 43 $31.43 $11.13 (2010 Q4) $47.46 (2007 Q1)
Retention rate (quarterly) 2001 Q2 to 2011 Q4 43 85.40% 78.4% (2002 Q1 and 2002 Q3) 88.6% (2010 Q1, Q3, and Q4)
WACC (quarterly) 2002 Q3 to 2011 Q4 38 3.01% 1.14% (2002 Q3) 5.43% (2005 Q3)
Market capitalization (mn) 2002 Q3 to 2011 Q4 38 $2805.23 $208.80 (2002 Q4) $13026.92 (2011 Q2)
Technological substitution model parameter estimates (2001 Q1 to 2011 Q4)
Ln(α) β γ N R-squared Root MSE
10.156*** −4.306*** 0.133*** 44 .9864 .1556
Recalibrated technological substitution model parameter estimates (2009 Q1 to 2011 Q4)
Ln(α) β γ N R-squared Root MSE
12.281** −6.529* 0.108** 12 .9710 .0684
***p b .01 **p b .05 *p b .10. Estimation of technological substitution was done using non-linear least squares. Customer numbers were in thousands. The α param-
eter was estimated in logarithm for ease of computation and presentation. R-squared may not be a reliable ﬁt statistic for non-linear least squares, so the root MSE
would be a better ﬁt measure (Srinivasan & Mason, 1986).
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Netﬂix.5
3. Data and estimation
Via Netﬂix's quarterly and annual SEC ﬁlings,6 I obtain the reported number of customers, customer acquisition cost, margin
per customer, and customer retention rate for each quarter from 2001 Q2 to 2011 Q4 (number of customers are available for
one quarter earlier from 2001 Q1). Data on customer retention or churn were no longer reported after 2011 Q4. Market capital-
ization values for Netﬂix are available after its IPO starting in 2002 Q3 and downloaded from Bloomberg.7 The discount rate i used
is the market WACC at any point in time for Netﬂix, downloaded from Bloomberg.8
Table 1 shows summary statistics and the estimated parameters from the technological substitution model.
4. Valuation results and discussion
Fig. 1a shows Netﬂix's customer equity values in comparison with market capitalizations on a quarterly basis. One can observe
the correspondence of customer equity to market capitalization over the ﬁrm's lifecycle phases and conditions.
4.1. Initial growth
Netﬂix began sustained proﬁtability after 2005 Q2, so I take the initial growth phase to run from 2002 Q3 to 2005 Q1.
Over the 11 quarters of this period, customer equity valued Netﬂix by an average of $666 million above market capitalization,
compared to an average overvaluation of $128 million in the subsequent 11 quarters (p b 0.01).9 Furthermore, 5 out of the 11
quarters during the initial growth phase showed net loss. Over these periods of loss, customer equity was $828 million too
high on average, which was not statistically different from the $531 million average overvaluation over the other 6 proﬁtable
quarters.itional accounting adjustments to the customer equitymay be performed before comparing tomarket capitalization as explained in Schulze, Skiera, andWiesel
These adjustments on net do not qualitatively impact the argument and results in the current study. Thus, I follow the original model of Gupta et al. (2004).
ﬂix SEC ﬁlings are available from ir.netﬂix.com. Last accessed: 31 July 2015.
market capitalization is available as daily data via Bloomberg ﬁeld name “CUR_MKT_CAP”. Last accessed: 31 July 2015.
WACC –WeightedAverage Cost of Capital – is themarket estimate of the discount rate to apply to the speciﬁcﬁrm, after taking into account risk, debt, and taxes
e et al., 2012). It is an average of the required rate of after-tax equity return and the required interest rate on debt for aﬁrm. TheWACC is available via Bloomberg
me “WACC”. Last accessed: 31 July 2015.
y IPOs fail in the ﬁrst few years (Demers & Joos, 2007). However, the overvaluation would not be due to unaccounted risk of start-up failure, because this risk
e accounted for in the WACC discount rate.
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Fig. 1. Panel (a): Customer equity values versus market capitalization, where customer equity is based on the model of Gupta et al. (2004). Panel (b): Customer
equity values versus market capitalization, where customer equity values incorporated recalibrated parameters after 2009 Q3.
4 S.T. Zhang / International Journal of Research in Marketing xxx (2016) xxx–xxxThus, customer equity does provide guidance on market capitalization in periods of negative proﬁt consistent with periods of
positive proﬁt. However, the customer equity model somewhat overvalued Netﬂix in the initial growth phase overall regardless of
proﬁtability.
4.2. Expansion and maturity
I take 2005 Q2 to 2008 Q4 as the expansion and maturity phase of the original Netﬂix DVD business before online video
streaming began to take off in 2009. Over the 15 quarters of this phase, customer equity tracked market capitalization remarkably
well — valuing within range in 9 out of 15 quarters. Even more remarkably, the average customer equity values did not statistically
differ from the market capitalizations over this period.
Furthermore, during the market crash of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 Q3 and 2008 Q4, when the NASDAQ composite
dropped 35%, customer equity continued to track market capitalization for Netﬂix.
4.3. Radical innovation
The most striking feature of Fig. 1a is the dramatic divergence of customer equity values from market capitalizations starting in
2009. This period coincides with the emergence and take-over of video streaming as Netﬂix's business model, and points to the
need to adjust the CLV customer equity model after a radical innovation to track market capitalization.Please cite this article as: Zhang, S.T., Firm valuation from customer equity:When does it work andwhen does it fail? International
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over the course of 2009–2010.10 Streaming reached an inﬂection point in 2010 Q4, when customers streamed more hours of con-
tent than they watched on DVD (2010 Annual Report, p.1). In 2010 Q4, Netﬂix announced that streaming would be the business
model of Netﬂix going forward, with CEO Reed Hastings stating to the press “We are now primarily a streaming video company
delivering a wide selection of TV shows and ﬁlms over the Internet” (Riley, 2010). Language also changed in the 2010 Annual
Report: “Going forward, we expect we will be primarily a global streaming business, with the added feature of DVDs-by-mail in
the US.” (2010 Annual Report, p.1).
Replacing DVD rental with streaming was a radical innovation that required investors to revise and recalibrate estimations of
Netﬂix's customer base. To capture investors' recalibration, Table 1 includes recalibrated estimates of the technological substitution
model parameters based only on data after 2009 Q1, when streaming became substantial. These recalibrated model parameters are
then used to produce revised valuations for Netﬂix from 2010 Q4 onwards, after the new business model became evident. Be-
tween 2009 Q3 and 2010 Q3, when the fate of streaming as the new business model was hanging in the balance, the revised val-
uations from recalibrated parameters are weighted with the old valuations using percentage of customers engaged in streaming, as
per available data described in Footnote 10, to proxy for investor belief in the likelihood of the new streaming business model.
As can be seen in Fig. 1b, after the recalibration adjustment, customer equity substantially tracks market capitalization after
2009.
5. Conclusion
This study of Netﬂix demonstrates that customer equity can serve as a good guide to a ﬁrm's market capitalization during
periods of stable expansion. Additionally, customer equity as a proxy for market capitalization is not impacted by volatility in
proﬁtability or a broad stock market crash. This supports the use of CLV and customer equity as marketing management metrics
to increase ﬁrm value under many lifecycle conditions.
However, Gupta et al. (2004) also had in mind the applicability of customer equity to value fast growing ﬁrms that rely on
innovation, such as internet ﬁrms. For ﬁrms that are growing via radical innovation, this study shows that CLV-based customer
equity models require timely recalibrations as radical innovations take off. This suggests a condition on the applicability of recent
CLV models that forecast customer behavior based on past behavior, for example Fader, Hardie, and Shang (2010) and Zhang,
Bradlow, and Small (2015). Parameters of such CLV models should be re-estimated after instances of radical innovation.
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